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I.

INTRODUCTION

When enjoying a concert, it is easy to get caught up in the energy and
excitement of seeing your favorite artist live. Behind the lights and sounds
of a live performance lies a complex business that balances the interests of
artists, promoters, and others working to bring artists to venues across the
world. The live music industry has evolved from its simplistic roots, with
business practices behind the music becoming equally advanced.1
Music festivals in particular are popular among both concert-goers and
promoters.2 Coachella Valley Music Festival (“Coachella”) is one of the
giants of the music festival industry, featuring over 170 performers and
drawing crowds of up to 125,000 people per day.3 Along with massive
festivals such as Coachella, there are also smaller and less polarizing
festivals with limited resources.4
In the live music industry, a typical radius clause stipulates that a
performer cannot play any other shows within a certain geographic radius
around the promoter’s event for a fixed period of time.5 In 2018, the business
* Senior Staff Member, American University Business Law Review, Volume 9; J.D.
Candidate, 2020, American University Washington College of Law; B.S. Biology, and
Nursing, Wagner College. I would like to thank the American University Business Law
Review staff for their help and encouragement throughout the entire writing and
publication process. I would also like to thank Professor Daniel Lenerz for shaping my
writing at the start of my legal studies. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and
family for their constant support.
1. See, e.g., Robert W. Hayes, Rock May Never Die, But It Sure Has Matured, DEL.
LAW. 20, 20–21 (2017) (discussing the music industry’s corporatization and progression
towards a monetary focus on live performances).
2. See Jeremy A. Gogel, Antitrust Concerns with Respect to Music Festival Radius
Clauses, 38 LINCOLN L. REV. 87, 87 (2011) (stating that music festivals gained popularity
following the 1969 Woodstock festival).
3. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 28, Soul’d Out Prods., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
No.3:18-cv-00598 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 2018) (explaining that Coachella is held at the Empire
Polo Club in Indio, California and over 1000 miles from Portland, Oregon where Soul’d
Out’s festival is held); Bruce Fessier, Coachella 2018, The Year Beyoncé Reigned, Was
a Historic Moment for the Festival, USA TODAY (last updated Apr. 23, 2018, 11:19 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2018/04/23/coachella-2018-recap-beyoncehistoric-success/541837002/ (discussing Coachella’s success in 2018).
4. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–7 (explaining that under Coachella’s
Radius Clause artists are prevented from performing at any small festival within the
clause’s geographic confines).
5. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 104 (stating that artists are required to sign radius
clauses in exchange for the opportunity to perform at large music festivals, preventing
them from freely touring around the festival’s date).
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practices behind large music festivals such as Coachella developed as part of
the public consciousness.6 Two lawsuits condemning the use of radius
clauses attracted the public’s attention.7 Soul’d Out Productions (“Soul’d
Out”), a small festival promoter, brought a lawsuit criticizing Coachella’s
use of an overbearing radius clause in its contracts with artists.8 Prior to
Soul’d Out’s lawsuit against Coachella, Eagle Theater Entertainment
(“Eagle”) brought a lawsuit against SFX React-Operating (“React”) with a
similar claim.9
Coachella’s Radius Clause restricts artists slated to perform at the event
from performing at other music festivals surrounding Coachella before and
after their performance.10 React’s radius clause similarly restricts artists
from freely playing in the vicinity of the venue.11 Both Soul’d Out and Eagle
alleged that the overbearing radius clauses used by Coachella and React
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) that guards
against monopolies or activities that restrict commerce.12
This Comment will focus on analyzing Soul’d Out Productions, LLC v.
Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc.,13 and SFX React-Operating LLC v.
Eagle Theater Entertainment, LLC.14 Part II will discuss the Sherman
6. See, e.g., Katie Bain, How the Music Industry Uses a Pervasive Secret Weapon
to Keep Bands from Freely Touring, LA WEEKLY (Apr. 18, 2017, 6:23 AM),
https://www.laweekly.com/music/how-music-festival-promoters-use-radius-clauses-tokeep-bands-from-freely-touring-8140333 (explaining that radius clauses have expanded
in geographic scope over the past few years as the result of the increase in earning
potential and business opportunities associated with music festivals).
7. See, e.g., Dave Brooks, Coachella’s Radius Clause Details Exposed in Legal
Fight With Oregon Festival, BILLBOARD (June 20, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/festivals/8462036/coachella-radius-clause-details-exposed-lawsuit-oregon
-festival (detailing the allegations against Coachella’s use of an overbearing Radius
Clause); Ann-Derrick Gaillot, Radius Clauses Are the Least Rock and Roll Thing in
Music, THE OUTLINE (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://theoutline.com/post/4129/
coachella-radius-clause-lawsuit?zd=1&zi=ed6jrpb2/ (discussing Eagle Theater
Entertainment’s lawsuit against SFX React-Operating regarding its radius clause).
8. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–6; Brooks, supra note 7.
9. Compare SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater Entm’t, LLC, No. 1613311, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134820, at *8–10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (bringing
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and RICO claims), with Second Am. Compl.,
supra note 3, ¶ 1 (alleging violations of “antitrust, unfair competition, tortious
interference, and unlawful restraint on trade”).
10. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–6.
11. See SFX React-Operating LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134820, at *6 n.1.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
13. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 3 (detailing allegations of the
lawsuit).
14. See generally SFX React-Operating LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134820, at *1
(alleging violations of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust
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Antitrust Act as it relates to radius clauses, and Part III will analyze
Coachella’s and React’s radius clauses and suggest that Coachella’s Radius
Clause is a per se violation of Section 1, in disagreement with the district
court’s dismissal of Soul’d Out’s antitrust claims. Part IV will go on to
recommend a modified test for radius clauses in the live music industry and
make an argument for increased use of the quick look analysis.
II.

RADIUS CLAUSES AND THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
a.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

The Sherman Antitrust Act is a federal statute that prevents formation of
monopolies or activities that restrict commerce.15 Section 1 of the Sherman
Act states that a contract that restrains trade amongst states is illegal.16
Section 1 only applies to activity between separate entities, which means that
it does not apply to acts between parent companies and their “wholly owned
subsidiaries” because of their “complete unity of interest.”17 To prove a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, one must typically show
an agreement that affects interstate commerce and unreasonably restrains
trade.18 Restraints on trade that violate the Sherman Act fall into two
categories: vertical or horizontal.19 A horizontal restraint is an “agreement
between competitors at the same level of the market structure.”20 Vertical
restraints are agreements between individuals at different market levels.21
Three elements that must be met to establish a violation of Section 1 include:
(1) “a contract, combination or conspiracy,” (2) “affecting interstate
commerce” that (3) “imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade.”22 To
analyze such violations, the courts typically use either the rule of reason test
or per se violation analysis.23
enrichment).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
16. Id.
17. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771, 776 (1984).
18. See, e.g., White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504
(6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (discussing the requirements that constitute a violation
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
19. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“[A]n
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition . . . is usually termed a ‘horizontal’ restraint,
in contradistinction to combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure
. . . which are termed ‘vertical’ restraints.”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. White & White, Inc., 723 F.2d at 504.
23. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958); In re Cardizem CD
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The Rule of Reason

Section 1 inquiries can be decided under either the rule of reason test or as
per se violations.24 Most restraints are analyzed under the rule of reason,
which “requires the factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances
of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition.”25 In contrast, when a restraint on trade “always or almost
always” restricts interstate competition, it is categorized as a per se violation
of Section 1.26
In Ohio v. American Express Co.,27 the Supreme Court applied the rule of
reason analysis and held that American Express’s antisteering provisions did
not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.28 To combat merchants diverting
business from American Express, the company included “antisteering”
provisions in its contracts with merchants.29 The Court applied the rule of
reason test because both parties agreed that American Express’s antisteering
provision was a vertical restraint on trade, meaning that it was “imposed by
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution.”30 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not prove that the antisteering
provisions had anticompetitive effects.31
Similarly, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,32 the
Supreme Court held that the rule of reason was an appropriate test to be
applied.33 Respondent claimed that petitioner ceasing sales in respondent’s
stores due to respondent’s policy to “refus[e] to sell to retailers that discount

Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906–07 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (discussing the applicability of different tests in trade
restraint claims).
24. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 906; see also N. Pac. Ry.
Co., 356 U.S. at 4–5 (explaining that violations of the Sherman Act can be analyzed
under the rule of reason).
25. White & White, Inc., 723 F.2d at 505.
26. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
27. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
28. See id. at 2280, 2283–84 (highlighting that American Express included
antisteering provisions in its contracts, which prevented merchants from “steering”
customers away from paying with American Express to avoid its higher fees).
29. See id. at 2280.
30. Id. at 2284.
31. See id. at 2290, 2303 (explaining that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of
proof required to show that American Express’s antisteering effects were competitive in
nature because they “stem[med from] negative externalities in the credit-card market and
promote Interbrand competition”).
32. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
33. Id. at 877.
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[its] goods below suggested prices” constituted a violation of Section 1.34
The Court reasoned the respondent’s “rel[iance] on pricing effects absent a
further showing of anticompetitive conduct” did not rise to the level of a per
se violation.35 Though the Court recognized “[t]he rule of reason as the
accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation
of [Section] 1,” it clarified that the “rule of reason does not govern all
restraints.”36
In Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.,37 the Ninth Circuit applied the rule of
reason test in a class action lawsuit brought by consumers alleging that
defendants, television programmers, exploited their full or partial ownership
of broadcast and cable channels by requiring consumers to purchase
“prepackaged tiers” of the bundled channels.38 Both parties had agreed that
the rule of reason analysis was appropriate.39 However, despite its common
application, the rule of reason test has been criticized as vague and costly,
which can make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.40
ii.

The Per Se Rule

Per se violations of Section 1 occur when a restraint on trade “facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.”41 Consequently, the per se rule is applied
to restraints that would “always or almost always tend to restrict competition
or decrease output.”42 The per se rule is appropriate when courts can predict
“with confidence that the restraint would be invalidated in . . . almost all
instances under the rule of reason.”43
Vertical restraints are generally found to be per se illegal under Section 1,
34. Id. at 883.
35. See id. at 895–96 (reasoning that the respondents did not address that the interests

of manufacturers and consumers are similar with regard to profits margins).
36. Id. at 885–86.
37. 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012).
38. See id. at 1195–96 (explaining that plaintiffs’ further allegations include that the
bundling resulted in leaving consumers with only the option to purchase packages
consisting of bundled channels from a sole programmer, thus impairing competition
between program television distributors).
39. Id. at 1197.
40. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1461–65 (2009) (demonstrating that the rule of reason test
is expensive, inaccurate, and time consuming).
41. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
42. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 876 (citing
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
43. Id. at 886–87.
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unless there is some agreement on price between the market participants.44
In addition to price-fixing, non-price horizontal restraints that allocate
territories, reduce output, or divide up customers are also found to be per se
illegal, along with “[h]orizontal group boycotts by competitors with shared
market power.”45 Other restraints may be brought under the per se rule if
they cause destructive anticompetitive effects and lack any procompetitive
effects.46 Though the per se rule does not require an elaborate inquiry into
the relevant industry to find illegality, the term is not as fixed as it appears.47
Before a restraint can be deemed per se illegal, “considerable inquiry into
market conditions may be required.”48
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court found that
Topco’s market-dividing scheme, which granted its members licenses that
allowed them to restrict competition in their territory, was a per se violation
of Section 1.50 Topco, a cooperative association of supermarket chains, was
charged with conspiring with its members through an agreement to “sell
Topco-controlled brands only within the marketing territory allocated to it,
and [to] refrain from selling Topco-controlled brands outside such marketing
territory.”51
Tying arrangements have also been found to be per se violations of the
Sherman Act.52 A tying arrangement occurs when a party agrees to sell one
product on a condition that the buyer also purchases a “tied” product or
agrees not to buy the product from another seller.53 When tied products
44. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 735–36 (explaining that a vertical restraint
must include a price agreement to constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
45. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK §
2:9 (2011), Westlaw ANTITRHDBK (updated Nov. 2018).
46. See id. (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)) (“Other concerted
activities may at least in theory be brought under the per se banner, if shown to have a
particularly ‘pernicious effect on competition’ and to lack ‘any redeeming virtue.’”).
47. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999); Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“[A]greements whose nature
and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry
is needed to establish their illegality—they are ‘illegal per se.’”).
48. Id. (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)).
49. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
50. See id. at 611–12.
51. Id. at 601, 610–11 (discussing Topco’s ability to give its members the right to
decide if “competition with other supermarket chains is more desirable than competition
in the sale of Topco-brand products.”).
52. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that tying
arrangements are “unlawful in and of themselves”).
53. Id. at 5–6.
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impede competition by limiting a buyer’s choice, thus denying access to the
market for no reason other than suppression, they are per se unlawful under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.54 For a tying arrangement to be unreasonable,
the seller must have significant dominance over the market.55 In Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,56 the Supreme Court held that Northern
Pacific Railway Co.’s “preferential routing clause” was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.57 The preferential routing clause in question forced the
lessees of the railway’s land to use Northern Pacific to ship all items they
manufactured.58 As most products were shipped over state lines, this
arrangement affected interstate commerce.59
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent
Ink Inc.60 found no tying arrangement where defendants did not have market
power in the tied products.61 Petitioners manufactured printing systems that
contained patented ink containers and printheads, along with unpatented
corresponding ink.62 Petitioners had an agreement with the manufacturers to
only fill the petitioners’ containers with their corresponding unpatented
ink.63 Respondents created an ink with the same chemical composition as
the petitioners’ ink and filed a suit alleging that petitioners were tying the
unpatented ink with the patented products.64 The Supreme Court held that
patent ownership did not automatically give a patentee market power and
that showing of market power is necessary to prove a tying arrangement.65

54. See id. at 3, 8 (holding that appellant railroad companies’ land lease contracts
containing “preferential routing” clauses, which required the “grantee or lessee to ship
over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the land, provided that its
rates (and in some instances its service) were equal to those of competing carriers” were
per se violations of Section 1).
55. See, e.g., id. at 6–7. But see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
35 (2006) (noting the decline in the Court’s “strong disapproval of tying arrangements”
and instead requiring a showing of market power to prove an illegal tying arrangement).
56. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
57. Id. at 3, 8.
58. See id. at 3.
59. See id.
60. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
61. Id. at 45–46 (stating that a patent holder does not automatically gain market
power through said patent).
62. See id. at 31.
63. See id. at 32 (stating that petitioners’ original infringement suit was dismissed,
and respondents subsequently filed a suit claiming a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act through tying).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 45–46 (holding that respondents must produce relevant evidence of the
petitioner’s alleged market power).
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Radius Clauses

Radius clauses in the live music industry restrict the artist’s ability to
work, similar to non-compete clauses in employment contracts.66 Radius
clauses have also been classified as a type of restrictive covenant.67 A
restrictive covenant is a private agreement between two parties that prevents
a party from taking a specific action.68
i.

Non-compete Clauses in Employment Contracts

Non-compete clauses in employment contracts generally restrict
employees from working for another employer for a certain time period or
in a set geographic location.69 When geographic restrictions are present in
non-compete clauses, courts analyze the scope of the area covered.70 Courts
consider the overall combination of factors to determine the validity of a noncompete clause.71 Non-compete clauses that contain unlimited or broad
restrictions on geographic areas are likely to be found unreasonable;
however, courts are often reluctant to deem these clauses per se
unenforceable for geographic reasons alone and prefer to apply a
reasonableness test instead.72 Courts analyze time restrictions similarly to
geographic restrictions and rely on a fact-dependent reasonableness test.73
Enforcement of strict non-compete clauses in the employment context is
66. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 104 (explaining that both radius clauses and noncompete clauses in employment contracts are types of restrictive covenants that prevent
employees from competing with an employer after their employment is terminated).
67. See id. at 88–89 (asserting that radius clauses used in commercial leasing are
restrictive covenants because they prevent tenants from freely operating outside of a
lease).
68. See Beth R. Minear & Eric R. Waller, Common Law of Restrictive Covenants,
28 ENERGY & MINERAL L. FOUND. § 15.02 (2007).
69. See Restrictive Covenants in the Employment Context, 285 CORP. COUNS.
PRIMERS NL 1, SEPT. 2017, at 2 [hereinafter Corporate Counsel].
70. See id. at 11; see also Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn.
1965) (explaining that courts look at whether a restraint is required to protect the
employer and whether it restrains the employee more than “reasonably necessary” to
achieve that protection).
71. See Corporate Counsel, supra note 69, at 31 (citing Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,
325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975)) (stating the factors considered in determining the
validity of a non-compete clause, which include the employee’s possession of trade
secrets, whether the employee is a customer’s only contact, and time and distance
restrictions).
72. See id.; see also Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating reluctance to deem a non-compete clause without an unlimited
geographic restriction as per se unreasonable).
73. See Corporate Counsel, supra note 69, at 24 (asserting that a circumstance
specific reasonableness test should be used to deal with time restrictions).
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associated with “both lower wage growth and lower initial wages.”74
Additionally, it can lead to decreased mobility of workers throughout an
industry, which can stifle economic growth.75
ii.

Radius Clauses in the Live Music Industry

In the live music industry, performers often sign contracts containing a
radius clause.76 A typical radius clause stipulates that a performer cannot
play at any other show within a certain radius of the promoter’s event for a
fixed period of time.77 The live music industry’s movement towards
corporatization has flowed naturally from the increasing popularity of
concerts.78 Along with Coachella, other major music festivals, such as
Lollapalooza and Bonnaroo, also utilize radius clauses.79 Though the clauses
differ in some respects, each festival requires the artist to accept them to have
an opportunity to perform.80
Smaller acts and regional venues and workers bear most of the harm
caused by overly restrictive radius clauses.81 In 2010, Lollapalooza’s radius
clause that “restrict[ed] bands from playing 180 days before and 90 days after
Lollapalooza within a 300-mile radius” became subject of an investigation
by the Illinois Attorney General for “potential antitrust violations.”82
Lollapalooza held the exclusive power to grant exceptions; and popular

74. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 19 (Mar. 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Noncompetes%20Report.pdf.
75. See id. at 19–20 (explaining that potential effects of non-compete enforcement
can have negative effects beyond the individual level).
76. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 104 (discussing the exclusivity agreements imposed
on artists by promoters of major music festivals).
77. See id. (“Promoters of every major American music festival force the acts slated
to perform at their events to sign an exclusivity, or radius, clause, which forbids these
acts from performing anywhere near the festival several months before and after the
event.”).
78. See Hayes, supra note 1, at 20–21 (discussing how improvements in recording
and listening quality inspired the current willingness to pay for a live music experience).
79. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 105.
80. See id. at 105–06 (discussing the ramifications of refusing to sign a radius clause,
including preventing artists from performing for large audiences).
81. See, e.g., Bain, supra note 6 (“[F]or smaller bands that depend on touring
revenue, agreeing to a radius clause means being elbowed out of markets for long periods
of time and grinding harder to make ends meet, in exchange for the slim hope that a
daytime slot at a mega-festival might make them the next Arcade Fire or Daft Punk.”).
82. Josh Wright, Lollapalooza and Antitrust, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (June 28, 2010),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/28/lollapalooza-and-antitrust/.
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artists were less likely to avoid the restrictions.83 The investigation resulted
in little else other than awareness that these clauses exist.84
iii. Coachella’s Radius Clause: Soul’d Out Prod., LLC v. Anschutz
Entm’t Grp., Inc.
Coachella takes place each year in Indio, California, over two weekends
in April.85 The festival draws crowds of 125,000 people per day86 with ticket
prices starting at $429 in 2018.87 Coachella’s Radius Clause is a “part of its
standard agreements with artists”; it explicitly forbids artists from
“performing at any other festival or themed event within a distance that
extends over 1300 miles” including “California, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington[, and] Arizona from December 15, 2017, until May 7, 2018.”88
Oregon-based Soul’d Out brought a lawsuit against Coachella for alleged
anticompetitive behavior.89 Soul’d Out’s complaint states that Coachella’s
Radius Clause is a per se violation of Section 1 because it ties together “openair music festivals,” “hard-ticket concert performances,” and “themed
events.”90 Soul’d Out further claims that Coachella and its promoters have
“substantial economic power” in the tied markets.91 On March 14th, 2019,
the district court dismissed Soul’d Out’s antitrust claims.92
83. Joel Rose, Lollapalooza Investigated by Illinois Attorney General, NPR MUSIC
(Aug. 4, 2010, 4:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2010/08/04/1289828
80/lollapalooza-undergoing-investigation-by-illinois-attorneygeneral.
84. See, e.g., Karen Gwee, Music Festivals and the Pursuit of Exclusivity,
CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (Sept. 26, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://consequenceofsound.net/
2016/09/music-festivals-and-the-pursuit-of-exclusivity/.
85. Josh Johnson & Lesley Messer, What is Coachella? Everything to Know About
the Music Festival, ABC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018, 6:56 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
GMA/Culture/coachella-music-festival/story?id=54404096.
86. George Varga, Coachella 2018 Preview: Beyoncé, Eminem, The Weeknd, New
Food Court, Drones and a New Emoji, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2018,
6:05 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/music/sd-et-musiccoachella-20180412-story.html.
87. Megan Leonhardt, What It Really Costs to Go to Coachella 2018, MONEY:
EVERYDAY MONEY (Mar. 29, 2018), http://time.com/money/5217998/cost-coachella2018-beyonce/.
88. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 33, 36.
89. See id. ¶¶ 1–2 (stating that Soul’d Out brought a lawsuit against Coachella along
with codefendants Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc., The Anschutz Corporation,
Goldenvoice, LLC, and AEG Presents, LLC).
90. See id. ¶ 163 (explaining AEG’s power to tie both the national and local markets
for “open air music festivals,” “hard-ticket concert performances,” and “themed events”).
91. Id.
92. See Soul’d Out Prod., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00598MO, 2019 WL 1212085, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2019); see also Nadia Dreid, Coachella
Escapes Rival’s Antitrust Suit for Second Time, LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2019, 3:29 PM),
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iv. React’s Radius Clause: SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle
Theater Entertainment, LLC
The second case, SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater
Entertainment, LLC, involves two promoters in the Electronic Dance Music
(“EDM”) market and has gained far less media attention.93 React required
artists to sign a contract with a radius clause that prohibited artists “from
playing anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of React’s event for periods
of 60, 90, or 120 days prior to and following the date of the event.”94 Eagle
alleged that the radius clause was a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.95 Eagle alleged that the radius clause made it “nearly
impossible for many nationally recognized EDM artists to play anywhere
else in the Midwest.”96 Ultimately, the radius clause was not found to be a
per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.97 As of February 15th, 2019,
both parties settled, and the claims were subsequently dismissed.98
III.

COACHELLA’S RADIUS CLAUSE VIOLATES SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract . . . in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal,” making it applicable to Coachella’s Radius
Clause that is included in most of its contracts with artists.99 In contracting
to perform at Coachella, artists must agree to adhere to the limitations set
forth by the Clause.100 Further, the Radius Clause involves activities
between separate entities ¾ the promoters and the acts ¾ to which Section
1 of the Sherman Act applies, rather than the promoters and wholly-owned
https://www.law360.com/articles/1138753 (discussing the District of Oregon’s finding
that Soul’d Out failed to prove Coachella’s had the necessary market power to stifle
competition).
93. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311,
2017 WL 3616562, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *5–6.
96. Id. at *2.
97. See id. at *7 (holding that defendants did not allege facts necessary to find
React’s radius clause to be anticompetitive under the per se analysis).
98. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal of All Claims 1–2, ECF No. 59.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 37 (discussing the
strict limitations imposed on artists by Coachella’s Radius Clause and the effects of those
limitations).
100. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–6 (highlighting that Coachella
invites artists to perform, but only on strict condition that they agree to certain terms
including a radius clause that restricts the ability of artists to perform or advertise other
performances besides Coachella).
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subsidiaries.101
The practice of using radius clauses meets the three elements required to
establish a violation of Section 1, including: (1) “a contract,” (2) “affecting
interstate commerce” that (3) “imposes an unreasonable restraint on
trade.”102 Specifically, Coachella’s Radius Clause is present in performance
contracts with artists.103 The Clause, which extends over 1,300 miles across
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, severely impacts
interstate commerce because it diminishes an already small pool of touring
artists by controlling over a hundred performers who play the event over each
of the two weekends.104 This restriction on performing in multiple states that
impacts such a large number of artists unreasonably restrains the market for
live performers.105
a.

Coachella’s Radius Clause is a Horizontal Restraint on Trade

Soul’d Out claims that Defendants have engaged in horizontal trade
restraint by carving out exceptions to its Radius Clause for competing
festivals in its 1300-mile restriction.106 Though the practice of dividing the
market among competitors does not explicitly involve price fixing, it does
reduce output and divide market power.107 Similar to United States v. Topco
Assoc., where Topco, an association of supermarket chains, divided the
relevant market by conspiring with its members to only sell Topco-controlled
brands within specified territories, Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc.
(“AEG”), Coachella’s promoter, is working with other promoters of large
101. See id. ¶¶ 34–36; see also Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
777 (1984) (“Any anticompetitive activities of corporations and their wholly owned
subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies may be policed adequately without resort to an
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. [T]he Federal Government, in its administration of
the antitrust laws, no longer accepts the concept that a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiaries can ‘combine’ or ‘conspire’ under [Section 1 of the Sherman Act.]”).
102. White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir.
1983).
103. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 33–36.
104. See id. ¶¶ 152–53; see also Raisa Bruner, Everything You Need to Know About
Coachella 2018, TIME (Mar. 27, 2018), http://time.com/5216002/coachella-2018/
(stating that in 2018, Coachella included over one hundred artists throughout the entirety
of its five-stage festival).
105. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 177 (alleging that Coachella’s Radius
Clause “results in a decrease in the quality of festivals, a decreased supply of artists for
both open air festival performances and also hard-ticket sales, and the shutdown of
concert venues within the scope of the radius.”).
106. See id. ¶¶ 178, 241 (explaining that only large and widely known festivals in
competition with Coachella, including SXSW and Ultra Music Festival, were exempted
from Coachella’s radius clause).
107. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 183–84; HOLMES, supra note 45, at 2.
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open-air festivals to divide the market.108 By dividing the market for music
festivals, Coachella is engaged in a horizontal restraint on trade similar to
Topco’s, which constitutes a per se violation of Section 1.109 Along with a
horizontal restraint on trade, AEG has created tying arrangements, which
have also been found to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.110
b.

Coachella and AEG’s Tying of Open-Air Festivals and HardTicket Sale Events is a Violation of Section I

Soul’d Out’s allegation that defendants violated Section 1 through tying
“open-air music festivals,” “hard-ticket concert performances,” and “themed
events” comports with prior case law regarding the practice of tying.111
Soul’d Out alleges that AEG’s restriction on playing “any other festival or
themed event” prevents performances in any other venue except those that
would potentially benefit AEG and comport with the Supreme Court’s
definition of tying set in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States.112
Like in Northern Pacific Railway. Co., where the defendant railroad
company tied two markets by including a clause in its land-leasing contracts
that forced lessees to ship any products produced on the leased lands over its
lines, Coachella and its promoters are tying “open-air music festivals,”
“hard-ticket concert performances,” and “themed events.”113 Consequently,
108. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 601–02 (1972); Second
Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 241; see also Iowa Pub. Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 285, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that
defendant’s horizontal agreement to boycott new stock loan market entrants qualifies as
a per se violation of the Sherman Act). But see NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128, 136 (1998) (holding that the per se group boycott rule does not apply to a single
buyer’s decision to buy from one seller rather than another).
109. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 240 (“AEG has engaged in a horizontal
restraint of trade, carving up the festival market with its competitors.”); see, e.g., Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 608 (holding Topco’s horizontal restriction to be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act).
110. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 278 (explaining that AEG’s economic
power along with Coachella’s alleged tying arrangement forces artists into signing
Coachella’s Radius Clause).
111. See id. ¶ 283 (“Effectively, if an artist performs at Coachella, that artist is
required to use AEG’s concert promotion business or venues if he or she wants to
perform within the radius—a period that effectively lasts for months and that stretches
thousands of miles beyond Coachella’s local market.”).
112. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (defining a tying
arrangement as “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will
not purchase that product from any other supplier.”).
113. See id. at 3, 6 (reasoning that the defendant railroad’s practice of forcing lessees
to ship products manufactured on its land over its railways substantially affected
interstate commerce); see also Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 155 (explaining
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Coachella is preventing artists from performing at more than just open-air
festivals.114
A restraint is found to be a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act after a “considerable inquiry” into relevant market conditions.115 AEG’s
tying arrangement is unreasonable because of its dominance over both the
open-air festival market and the market for hard-ticket sales and themed
events.116 Coachella’s status as one of the largest music festivals in the world
coupled with its ability to enforce its overbearing Radius Clause is
representative of its power in the open-air festival market.117 According to
Soul’d Out, this market dominance extends into “hard-ticket sales in the
Pacific Northwest” by tying artists’ rights to performances in the Pacific
Northwest to performances at AEG venues or AEG’s concert promotion
business.118
AEG’s tying arrangement differs from the alleged tying arrangement in
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., where the respondents did
not establish market power.119 In AEG’s case, the there is no patent at issue,
and its market dominance is exemplified by Coachella’s status as one of the
AEG’s ability to use its market power to limit artist availability).
114. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 3, 11–12 (holding that appellant rail road
companies’ land lease contracts containing “preferential routing” clauses, which required
the “grantee or lessee to ship over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on
the land, provided that its rates (and in some instances its service) were equal to those of
competing carriers,” were per se violations of Section 1); Second Am. Compl., supra
note 3, ¶¶ 284, 287 (explaining that the manipulation of artists performances outside of
Coachella extends to other markets because AEG’s definition is broad and inclusive of
smaller festivals that do not directly compete with Coachella).
115. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)).
116. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6–7 (noting that the preferential routing clauses
are unlawful restraints on trade because of the extensive landholdings, which create a
substantial restriction on interstate commerce); see also Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35 (2006) (showing of market power required to show illegality
of tying arrangements).
117. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 164–65 (stating that the power of
Coachella, and therefore AEG, allows the company to force tying where there is no
benefit for the artist, consumer, or the festival, but would benefit AEG’s other interests);
Ashley Rayner, The 25 Biggest Music Festivals Around the World in 2018, THE TRAVEL
(June 29, 2018), https://www.thetravel.com/the-25-biggest-music-festivals-around-theworld-in-2018/ (noting the transformation Coachella has undergone from indie music
festival to a major event attracting big industry names such as Beyoncé and Lady Gaga).
118. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 156, 168 (explaining that AEG owns
two venues in Seattle which seat less than 2,000 people, along with a larger music festival
that takes place in Seattle and its own ticketing agency).
119. See Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that the holder of a patent
does not automatically give the patentee market power).
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largest music festivals in the world and extends to the market for hard-ticket
sales.120 The egregious effects of AEG’s tying arrangement on the market,
such as lost profits and inability of artists to form relationships with
promoters, differentiate it from other restrictions, such as restrictive
covenants in property law and non-compete clauses.121
c.

Departure from Restrictive Covenants and Non-compete Clauses

While Coachella’s Radius Clause may resemble restrictive covenants in
property law, it differs in key aspects.122 Radius clauses in commercial
leasing agreements prevent tenants from operating certain retail businesses
in the same area as the anchor tenant,123 while radius clauses in the live
festival market prevent hundreds of artists from performing across several
states.124
The similarities between Coachella’s Radius Clause and non-compete
clauses in employment contracts, which are analyzed under the rule of
reason, include the restrictions both place on the party’s ability to work.125
Employment non-compete clauses generally affect a single employee after
his or her departure, while Coachella’s Radius Clause applied to over 170
acts in 2018, thus affecting the freedom of over 100,000 consumers to choose
when and where they can see the artists perform.126 Further, the decreased
economic growth and mobility throughout the market caused by strict
enforcement of non-compete clauses are increased exponentially in the case
of Coachella’s Radius Clause due to the long list of artists restricted from
performing within the Clause’s broad geographic reach.127

120. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 168 (highlighting AEG’s
ownership of smaller venues throughout Seattle along with its own ticketing company).
121. See id. ¶¶ 156, 159 (“Soul’d Out Productions has been damaged through the loss
of profits from performances by artists who wanted to perform at the Soul’d Out Music
Festival but were pressured not to by AEG, relying on the Radius Clause[,] along with
its reduced ability to develop ongoing relationships with artists . . . .”). See generally
Corporate Counsel, supra note 69 (discussing restrictive covenants in non-competes).
122. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 87–88 (analogizing radius clauses in the live music
industry to radius clauses in other industries).
123. See id. at 88–89 (explaining that radius clauses are used as tools to protect the
value of a lease).
124. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 4, 7, 9.
125. See Corporate Counsel, supra note 69, at 18; Gogel, supra note 2, at 89.
126. See generally Fessier, supra note 3 (discussing the attendance at Coachella in
2018).
127. See id.; OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 74.
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Soul’d Out’s Allegations and the Rule of Reason

Coachella’s Radius Clause also differs from other types of restraints that
courts usually analyze under the rule of reason.128 Applying the rule of
reason would require further inquiry into whether, under all of the
circumstances present in the case, a restraint poses a restriction on
competition.129 Unlike in Ohio v. American Express Co., where the Supreme
Court applied the rule of reason test to analyze American Express’s
antisteering provisions because they constituted a vertical restraint, AEG
imposed a horizontal restraint on trade in the open-air festival market by
carving out exceptions for other large open-air festivals, which rises to the
level of a per se violation.130
Coachella’s Radius Clause also differs from Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., in which the Supreme Court applied the rule of
reason test to decide whether respondent’s claim that petitioner’s ceasing to
sell in respondent’s stores due to respondent’s policy to “refus[e] to sell to
retailers that discount its goods below suggested prices” violated Section
1.131 The Supreme Court’s reasoning that respondent’s “rel[iance] on pricing
effects absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct” did not rise to
the level of a per se violation is not applicable to Coachella’s use of the
Radius Clause because Soul’d Out was able to show several instances of
anticompetitive conduct detrimental to its business.132
AEG’s actions also differ from Brantley v. NBC Universal, where
128. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280, 2284 (2018) (stating that all
parties consented to a rule of reason analysis because they agreed the antisteering
allegations against American Express constituted a vertical restraint on trade); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–87 (2007) (applying the
rule of reason test where respondent’s attempt to prevent discounted prices was
insufficient to show a per se violation of section 1); Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675
F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that competition among television channel
distributors was not negatively affected where consumers were forced to buy bundled
television channel packages).
129. White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 505 (6th Cir.
1983) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (explaining
that a rule of reason analysis takes into account all details of a case, making it time
consuming and expensive to litigate).
130. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280; Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 6,
10; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (discussing
the differences between horizontal and vertical restraints).
131. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 885 (declining
respondent’s reasoning that the per se rule was justified).
132. See id. at 885, 899 (holding that the rule of reason test was applicable to decide
whether petitioner’s ceasing to sell in respondent’s stores due to respondent’s policy of
exclusively selling to retailers at a fixed price violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act); see also Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 7.
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defendants, television programmers, impaired competition between program
television distributors by bundling channels in which they had full or partial
ownership, leaving consumers with no choice but to purchase the bundled
channels.133 The effects of enforcing Coachella’s Radius Clause extend
beyond difficulties for the individual consumer, as it leaves the consumers
with no way to see their favorite acts other than paying at least $429 for
general admission tickets.134 Coachella’s Radius Clause could also lead to
shutdowns of smaller venues that are unable to book enough acts to remain
operational due to a great number of artists being prevented from touring in
the area.135
Further, unlike in Brantley and American Express Co., where all parties
agreed the applicable test was the rule of reason, Soul’d Out alleges that
Coachella’s Radius Clause is a per se violation of Section 1, which makes
the rule of reason analysis inapplicable.136
Additionally, the rule of reason test is often criticized as costly,137 which
may contribute to a smaller promoter’s inability to bring suit, as exemplified
by the disparity in Coachella’s and Soul’d Out’s sizes and cost of
attendance.138 The overall effects of Coachella’s Radius Clause on the
market differentiates it from cases that are reviewed under the rule of reason,
bringing it to the level of a per se violation.139
e.

Coachella’s Radius Clause Compared to React’s Radius Clause

Soul’d Out’s allegations against Coachella are analogous to Eagle’s case
against React’s radius clause. Unlike Coachella, which includes hundreds
of artists across multiple genres,140 React exclusively covers the EDM
133. See Brantley, 675 F.3d at 1195–96 (explaining that the rule of reason was not
implicated because the requirement to sell both high and low demand channels together
did not negatively affect competition).
134. Leonhardt, supra note 87.
135. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 37.
136. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (citing Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)) (“The parties also correctly
acknowledge that, like nearly every other vertical restraint, the antisteering provisions
should be assessed under the rule of reason.”); Brantley, 675 F.3d at 1197.
137. See Stucke, supra note 40, at 1462–63, 1465 (explaining that the high amount of
“fact-intensive, time consuming, [and] costly” issues relevant in the rule of reason
analysis lead to inaccurate and inconsistent results because “[n]either the judiciary nor
economic experts have sufficient expertise on the actual workings of the market to
accurately assess the likely effects of these nuanced restraints.”).
138. See, e.g., Vagra, supra note 86 (discussing the details of Coachella’s 2018
festival); Leonhardt, supra note 87 (discussing the cost of attending Coachella).
139. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 54–55, 58.
140. See Fessier, supra note 3 (highlighting Coachella’s success in 2018).

2020

THE NOT-SO-FREE SPIRIT OF COACHELLA

413

market.141 Further, React’s radius clause “prohibits artists from playing
anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of React’s event for periods of 60,
90, or 120 days prior to and following the date of the event,”142 while
Coachella’s Radius Clause covers 1,300 miles.143 The restricting effects of
React’s radius clause, even though it doesn’t reach as far as Coachella’s
Clause, are proportional to the smaller EDM market.
Though Eagle alleged that the radius clause was a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it unreasonably prevented many EDM
artists from booking shows,144 React’s radius clause presents similar tying
and horizontal restraint issues that differentiate Coachella’s Radius Clause
from Brantley v. American Express Co. and Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., which were both analyzed under the rule of reason.145 Under
this line of reasoning, both Coachella’s and React’s radius clauses should be
analyzed as per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
f.

Coachella’s Radius Clause Rises to the Level of a Per Se Violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

Coachella’s overbearing Radius Clause imposes restraints on the live
music industry. Smaller and mid-size acts are left without the ability to book
venues within driving distance of the major festival.146 Competing venues
may lose out on bookings because artists’ tours in the area are typically
shorter than the one or two months covered by the radius clause.147 In
addition to harmful effects on artists, their decreased availability causes
reduced hard-ticket sales and ultimately reduces the need for concert
venues.148 Artists’ decreased availability also limits consumers’ choice of
when, where, and for how much they can see their favorite artists.149
141. SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017
WL 3616562, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017).
142. Id. at *1–2.
143. Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 36.
144. Id. ¶ 26.
145. Id.; see Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283–85 (2018); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 (2007); Brantley v. NBC
Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2012).
146. See Bain, supra note 6 (discussing the hazardous and costly circumstances faced
by smaller acts when they cannot drive shorter distances between performances).
147. See id. (exemplifying how bands and venues lose economic opportunities due to
restrictive radius clauses).
148. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 89–90 (explaining the negative effects
of decreased artist availability on concert venues).
149. See Gaillot, supra note 7; see also Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 75
(explaining that radius clauses force an increase in demand for tickets at Coachella
because consumers’ options for seeing their favorite bands are limited).
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Coachella’s refusal to let artists advertise other performances in nearby states
also harms the potential to draw crowds, harming both artists and smaller
venues.150
Coachella’s Radius Clause is a per se violation of Section 1 because it
“facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output,”151 and radius clauses “always or
almost always tend to restrict competition or decrease output.”152 The effects
that an overbearing radius clause has on restricting the success of competing
venues and decreasing the availability of available artists are exemplified
through both React’s and Lollapalooza’s radius clauses.153 The harm caused
by overbearing radius clauses consistently restrains trade; therefore, courts
will likely be able to predict with certainty that they violate Section 1.154
Further, AEG’s practice of carving out exceptions to its Radius Clause for
competing festivals constitutes a horizontal restraint, which is considered a
per se violation of Section 1 when it reduces output or divides markets.155
Coachella’s Radius Clause is comparable to Supreme Court cases where
horizontal restraints were found to be per se violations of Section 1. Similar
to United States v. Topco Assoc., AEG’s horizontal carveout for other large
festivals is likely a per se violation.156
AEG’s tying of open-air music festivals and hard-ticket concert
performances and themed events constitutes a tying agreement, which has
been found to violate Section 1.157 AEG’s tying agreement is similar to
150. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 143 (“[E]ach of the performance
agreements between [AEG] and the artists that were scheduled to play at Coachella
contains the Radius Clause that prohibits them from advertising, publicizing, or leaking
any Festival or Themed Event (as defined in the agreements) in the states of California,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, or Arizona between December 15, 2017, and May 7,
2018.”).
151. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
152. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citing
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
153. SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017
WL 3616562, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017); Wright, supra note 82 (discussing the
claim that Lollapalooza’s radius clause has decreased business for local venues and
promoters).
154. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1958).
155. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 183, 220; see also United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608–09 (1972).
156. See, e.g., Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 608–09 (holding that Topco’s market
dividing scheme of allowing its members to use licenses granted by Topco to restrict
competition in their territory was a per se violation of Section 1); see Compl., supra note
3, ¶ 298 (alleging that AEG exempting competing music festivals from Coachella’s
radius clause constitutes a horizontal restraint).
157. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 171 (“AEG asserts that its definition of
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Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, where the railway possessed
significant economic power, which it used to control large numbers of
purchasers and give it preference over its competition.158 Coachella’s tying
arrangement is unreasonable because of Coachella’s proven dominance over
the market for both open-air music festivals and hard-ticket sales.159
g.

Consequences of Finding Coachella’s Radius Clause a Per Se
Violation

A decision to find an overbearing radius clause to be a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act would have far-reaching effects for smaller
acts. If courts found the radius clause to be a per se violation, any similar
clauses would be invalidated.160 Promoters would no longer be able to utilize
radius clauses with requirements similar to Coachella’s restrictions.161
The industry could implement policies that would limit radius clauses to a
state within which a festival is held, or within less than a hundred miles of
and the same month as the date of the performance. This would ease the
burden on small artists who would no longer need to drive hundreds of miles
to reach their next venue.162
IV.

MODIFIED TEST FOR RADIUS CLAUSES IN THE LIVE MUSIC
INDUSTRY AND STATUTORY CHANGES

Based on the serious effects of the tying arrangements and horizontal
agreements that stem from Coachella’s Radius Clause, it should have been
held to be a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As the radius
clause lawsuits are only recently becoming more common, an initial standard
that balances the rule of reason and per se analyses could be introduced to
alleviate the courts’ reluctance to find an unfamiliar type of restraint to be a
‘festivals’ and ‘themed events’ includes events like the Soul’d Out Music Festival, which
does not directly compete with Coachella in the open air music festival market.”); N.
Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5–7 (holding appellant railroad companies’ land lease contracts
containing “preferential routing” clauses, which required the lessee to ship anything
produced on Defendant’s land over its lines, to be a tying arrangement).
158. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 3, 7–8 (explaining that the defendant railroad
company owned substantial amounts of land from which clients purchased goods and
forced use of its railroad to ship the goods).
159. Id. at 6–7; Second Am. Compl., supra note 3, ¶¶ 31, 33–34; Rayner, supra note
117.
160. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that per se violations occur when a restraint on trade lowers output and restricts
competition in the majority of cases).
161. See id.
162. See Bain, supra note 6 (explaining that artists are forced to drive unsafe distances
between shows to avoid violating overbearing radius clauses).
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per se violation.163
A modified test would have to be only slightly more forgiving, require
more depth than the per se analysis, and still be less burdensome than the
costly and vague rule of reason test.164 A potential modification to the rule
of reason could be removing inquiry into procompetitive effects. Effects on
Coachella’s promoters are not anticompetitive because the festival would
likely be profitable without the radius clause.
An already established quick look analysis provides an intermediate
standard between the per se analysis and the rule of reason test and requires
a less intensive inquiry into the relevant market.165 Courts turn to the quick
looks analysis when “no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character” of restraints, such as horizontal
agreements or agreements to withhold a particular service.166 The quick look
analysis could be used as the threshold for deciding whether overbearing
radius clauses are per se violations of Section 1 until courts accumulate
adequate experience in deciding these types of cases.167
Though the per se test should be the standard for overbearing radius
clauses, using the quick look analysis rather than the rule of reason would
lessen the need for costly discovery and allow smaller promoters and artists
to bring suits against larger players.168 Smaller promoters and artists are
most negatively affected by overbearing radius clauses, and will be in a
better position to bring suit if costs are lowered.169
Along with using a modified test or the quick look analysis in lieu of the
rule of reason to establish per se unlawfulness, statutory changes at the state
level could also prevent overbearing clauses. The Illinois Attorney
163. See White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir.
1983) (explaining that some forms of restraint have been recognized as per se violations
of the Sherman Act through the court’s prior experience with that particular type of
restraint).
164. See Stucke, supra note 40, at 1461–65.
165. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theater Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311,
2017 WL 3616562, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017).
166. Id. (stating that the quick look analysis “would not require an analysis of the
surrounding market”).
167. White & White, Inc., 723 F.2d at 504 (stating that “judicial experience” has
allowed courts to identify per se violations of Section 1).
168. SFX React-Operating LLC, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7; Bain, supra note 6. See
generally Edward Burnett, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach,
62 SMU L. REV. 493 (2009) (discussing the efficiencies of the quick look analysis along
with its use as a “middle-ground” test for antitrust litigation).
169. See Stucke, supra note 40, at 1462–65 (explaining that the rule of reason test is
expensive because of the more intricate fact based analysis necessary to complete the
test); Bain, supra note 6 (highlighting the negative effects on smaller artists and
promoters caused by overbearing radius clauses).
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General’s investigation into Lollapalooza’s radius clause shows that there is
interest at the state level to prevent restraint on the live entertainment
market.170 For example, a state could require that radius clauses do not cover
a geographic area outside the city and do not extend past the week or month
of the festival. This would allow artists to freely tour before and after the
festival and festivals to ensure consumers who are planning to attend
festivals during that time will not be dissuaded from attending.
V. CONCLUSION
Radius clauses have been the industry standard for promoters of large
open-air music festivals. These overbearing clauses have been brought to
the public attention through lawsuits by smaller competitors who are being
harmed by them. Soul’d Out Productions, LLC v. Anschutz Entertainment
Group, Inc. gives an example of an overbearing radius clause and its harmful
effects on the market.171
Coachella’s overbearing Radius Clause should have been a per se
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act; therefore, future cases where
festivals have market dominance, overbearing radius clauses should be
accepted as violations at face value and no longer require in depth analysis
into market conditions. Moving away from the in-depth analysis would
allow smaller promoters and artists to bring suits when their businesses are
harmed. If per se analysis is initially refused by courts, the quick look
analysis should replace the rule of reason as the applicable test in deciding
whether radius clauses violate Section 1.

170. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 82 (detailing the Illinois Attorney General’s
investigation into Lollapalooza’s use of an overbearing radius clause).
171. See, e.g., Bain, supra note 6 (highlighting the harmful effects of an overbearing
radius clause).

